Via Patrick Bond: Last weekend a group of Zimbabwe scholars–organized by University of Kwazulu-Natal School for Development Studies PhD student, Showers Mawowa, and University of Johannesburg professor David Moore–met in Zimbabwe’s second city, Bulawayo, to discuss political and economic developments in that country. (I have copies of the papers; email me off-blog and I’ll forward them to you.)

Meanwhile, here are Zimbabwean analysts Alois Mlambo and Brian Raftopoulos (they’re also part of the Bulawayo conference), in a  CMI Brief (that’s the Bergen, Norway-based organization) on “Zimbabwe’s Multilayered Crisis.” Here’s the most relevant section:

… the [The Government of  is challenged by concerns over the next election and a ruling party that has refused to give up state power after an electoral loss. Indeed, ZANU-PF continues to control of the central levers of the military and security sectors and controls the ministries responsible for these forces. The party has thus far declared an unwillingness to consider any reform that might weaken this control. This is paralleled by a lack of any substantive budgetary support to the Inclusive Government and to those social delivery ministries (e.g. health, education) occupied by the MDC. Budgetary conflicts have further divided the transitional government with ZANU-PF claiming that the MDC was already receiving favourable treatment from the donors.

Mugabe’s position is also buttressed by his continued attempts to frame his political actions as anti-colonialist struggles and SADC solidarity around this trope. From this position, Mugabe has succeeded in moving the centre of the debate to the West’s unwillingness to accept an African agreement. Mugabe’s framing is especially salient in the face of the West’s demands for democracy and respect for human rights as a contradiction to the realities of global political and economic inequality. In addtion it is easy for Mugabe to play on Britain’s colonial legacy and the often ‘clumsy positioning’ of the British government in the crises.

… [T]he GPA has also seen some progress in the politics of the country. Progress can be seen with a certain degree of stabilisation in the economy and the drastic disappearance of hyper-inflation. Some progress is also evident on the political front, with the appointment of the Electoral, Human Rights and Media Commissions and the introduction of a Reserve Bank reform Bill that will remove the capacity of the Reserve Bank Governor to carry out the kind of quasi fiscal activities that helped to sustain ZANU-PF. Moreover, the Mugabe regime has been forced to become more accountable to parliament and in cabinet decision-making, while the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), which was set up to monitor the implementation of the GPA, has provided an important forum for continued negotiations between the parties. The overall effect of these efforts has been a reduction, though not complete removal, of political violence in the country.

These small steps of progress could however, very quickly evaporate if there is a hasty move to hold new elections before a fuller implementation of the GPA. The assumption that a quick election will resolve the Zimbabwe crisis is one of the most dangerous propositions currently argued for by some of the players in Zimbabwe. As demonstrated in the 2008 election, the challenge today is not found in an inability of the opposition to win elections, but the inability to translate an opposition election victory into state power. The ZANU-PF regime remains unwilling to release the levers of state power. Therefore, at this stage in Zimbabwe’s history it may be more advisable to extend the period of power sharing in order to prevent a disastrous return to the situation in 2008.

As the situation in Kenya has shown, there are definite risks associated with an extended period of power sharing, including:

• The entrenchment of the more repressive forces in the state

• Conflicts between the partners in government as a result of dual structures in the state – one falling under the President, the other under the Prime Minister.

• The loss of confidence in state institutions and a growing cynicism over the experience of an inclusive government

• The convergence of interests between parties over the accumulation of resources

• Long delays in the implementation of a constitutional review process

• Divisions in civil society over the GPA

• The opposition’s inability to provide an alternative political strategy for state power.

The Zimbabwean crisis illustrates the complexity of attempting to defeat a party of liberation through elections in a region in which the legacies of anti-colonial struggles still have a great deal of resonance. Within this resonance, the demands for human rights and political democratisation can be constructed as an extension of a Western regime change agenda. The crisis also reveals the limitations of SADC as a regional organisation for dealing with ruling parties that refuse to adhere to its formal democratic principles by resting their tenure on a liberation struggle and coercion. With these limitations the Zimbabwean opposition is forced to fight for space within the GPA in hopes of creating the conditions for an election that would allow for the possibility of a power transfer.

At the same time, an election that does not deal with the tendency for the regime to use the military-security complex as a means for resisting power transfers is not likely to move Zimbabwe beyond the dilemmas that gave rise to the GPA in the first place. To move beyond those dilemmas, the West, and the EU in particular, must develop the language and policies of engagement that continue to encourage the implementation of the GPA.

While a role for selective sanctions and targeted measures may still be required, the policy drift must move toward increasing engagement around development assistance. The future of the democratic forces in Zimbabwe depends, in important ways, on its capacity to lead an economic recovery program that will strengthen the country’s social base. The assumption that a deepening crisis and continued sanctions will be advantageous to the opposition is a dangerous fallacy.

The assumption that a quick election will resolve the Zimbabwe crisis is one of the most dangerous propositions currently argued by some of the players in Zimbabwe.